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Abstract. In the paper it is argued that cosmopolitanism based on human needs would be 
the most legitimate way to organize the emerging global community. Such cosmopolitanism 
should be rooted in the notion of basic human needs, for instance: security, autonomy, 
identity and well-being. Although the notion of human need is universalistic (thereby 
providing space for meta-consensus), the “human nature” derived from this notion is not 
necessarily fixed. Deliberation on the needs and political practice of their satisfaction will 
enable the real progress of cosmopolitanism, more quickly and without numerous problems 
that the human right-based approach is facing nowadays. Global democracy requests 
certain universalism in ethics, but it has to be different from those previously attempted, 
while also the everyday position of individuals in different parts of the world has to be 
improved considerably. 
Key words: human needs, cosmopolitanism, universalism, deliberation, global justice, 
democracy. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this paper is to offer one possible way of cosmopolitan thought development, 
namely, the one which is based on human needs theory and on the practice of need 
definition, satisfaction and operationalization. A short insight on potential advantages of 
needs is provided compared to the theory and ideology of human rights. It shall be argued 
that universalism (if truly universal) is still useful and even in a sense necessary for keeping 
the cosmopolitan blade of critique sharp. Cosmopolitan values may be justified only by 
relying on the concept of human nature, and it is exactly there that the tradition of thinking 
about human needs enters the picture. Of course, the work of deconstructivists, postmodern 
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thinkers and our post-metaphysical epoch in general immensely complicates the defense 
of any foundations and grand narratives, but universalizing thinking, in our view, represents a 
vital element of cosmopolitanism, as a stance that emphasizes equal human dignity of all 
individuals. That is why this particular debate is left aside for the moment and it is stated 
(for our purposes) that we at least need pragmatic, if not philosophical (epistemological) 
universalism; the conditions in which we live and diversities of the world make the 
cosmopolitan enterprise impossible without universalizing impetus. Attempts to strengthen 
and institutionalize cosmopolitan ideas have, up to now, mostly been carried out through 
the doctrine and practice of human rights, which was not the best way to make them 
accessible to large number of people from different countries and cultures. So, instead of 
rejecting every universalism (which would be per se devastating for the cosmopolitan 
theory), what is needed is a universalism of a different kind. A situation in which all 
individuals would have a real chance and capability to satisfy their human needs (which are 
themselves open to discussion and non–fixed) will prove to be a more appropriate precondition 
for establishing a cosmopolitan order and multiplying identities than pursuing a legal, 
westernized and pure deliberative approach. 
2. THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN NEED.  
UNIVERSALISM, COSMOPOLITANISM AND THEORY OF NEEDS 
There are many definitions of human needs, and here they will not (because of lack of 
space and limited scope of the paper) be listed or explained, nor will time be devoted to 
depicting the debate on human needs and all its complex elements and issues. Our 
attempt is to just remind cosmopolitan thinkers of this almost forgotten body of 
knowledge that could be helpful in their endeavor. Human needs theory unfortunately 
holds quite a weak position in social sciences, and its most important strongholds today 
are the fields of peace studies and conflict resolution. Initially developed in psychology 
(Abraham Maslow being the one of the pioneers), it made an impact on sociology and 
other sciences, but was later put aside, perhaps due to its leftist background and the 
triumph of liberal thought in mainstream academia. Also, many critics of the human 
needs theories were forewarning that their paternalistic potential may be dangerous to 
freedom and that needs cannot be successfully distinguished from wants (which was one 
of the key basis of these theories), but the arguments of the critics were not as strong as 
they seemed (Watt 1982, 541–542). 
Needs are requirements that a person has to have in order to live a life with enough 
dignity. It presupposes certain material goods, as well as more sociological and psychological 
conditions creating the possibilities for living an autonomous life. When explaining the 
complex relations between needs and rights, one has to take into account that human 
needs theory is essential when thinking about foundations of human rights-based approaches. 
According to Gasper: “Basic needs normative theory is one systematic way to look at 
normative foundations, for rights or for any other normative theory” (Gasper 2007, 16). 
Also, essential prerequisites for strongly–felt needs (like water, food, shelter) are candidate 
human rights (Gasper 2007, 17). Human rights are always a kind of human social practice 
(Donelly 2013, 17), while needs are also more closely related to the natural and animal 
world. Rights are implemented and secured by legal mechanisms. Although human rights 
and human needs theories share a common history and are principally directed at the 
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same goal of ensuring that people can maintain their life, freedom and chances for 
personal development, human rights discourse has through time become too concentrated 
on political and civil rights and weakened its economic, social and cultural dimension. 
The essential idea of the concept of need is that failure to satisfy these drives (instincts, 
preconditions of normal development of human nature) will lead to physical or psychological 
damage to a person or group of persons. “Humans need a number of essentials to survive” 
(Marker 2003). Needs are universal motivations (Burton 1990, 36), and any lack of 
obtaining what is required will produce destructive results (Rubenstein 2001). So, needs 
are supposed to transcend differences in class, nation, gender, religion and culture, and to 
represent (at least relatively) an objective basis of grasping genuine characteristics of 
human beings. However, the universalism of human needs is not unambiguous. Johan 
Galtung is very careful (but also inexplicit) when he says that “there is something 
universal” in the notion of human need (Galtung 1978, 6). Rubenstein argues, following 
Marxist tradition, that needs are historical, and that some of them are becoming universal 
(Rubenstein 2001).  
In order for human needs to be truly “human” they have to include a minimum of 
universalistic content, but it does not mean that all needs are always and completely equal 
and/or identical in different persons, times and places. It is difficult to talk about 
unalterable human nature, or about ultimate sociobiological foundations of politics, when 
there are such harsh critics of all grand narratives. But that “human nature” derived from 
human needs theory is not necessarily fixed. Actually, it is precisely the concept of 
human need (understood in sense of historical, changeable features of men) that provides 
the opportunity for global deliberation, because the one and single universal list of human 
needs should not be posed, but a large number of them created and discussed.  
Cosmopolitanism can hardly ever be separated from universalism, or more precisely the 
claim to universalism. The premise of unity of all human beings and ultimate equality of their 
dignities is fundamental to cosmopolitans (Chernilo 2009, 533–534). Cosmopolitanism by 
default implies universalism in ethics (Lachapelle 2007, 366–368). On the other hand, 
theoreticians are more and more aware of the importance of the particularistic dimension of 
the cosmopolitan worldview (Levy and Sznaider 2007, 159–160); this dimension is mostly 
visible and valuable in respecting the differences of individuals and nations, or the cultural 
background different people carry with them. Beck is speaking of “contextual universalisms” 
(Beck and Sznaider 2010, 393), which leads us to pose a legitimate question: should 
academicians talk about a single universalism or many of them? Besides unsolved theoretical 
and epistemological issues (or in a sense because of them), this author argues for keeping 
the universalistic momentum as an irreplaceable component of creating conditions for 
coexistence in the interdependent world. Without basic universalism and recognizing 
universal norms (procedural, but also substantive, at least in the very crude form that is 
rooted in common sense), it would not be possible to continue with cosmopolitan 
promotion, and that is why it seems that universalism is not a nemesis to be afraid of. Thus, 
“universalism is an aspiration, a moral goal to strive for; it is not a fact, a description of 
the way the world is” (Benhabib 2008, 18). One has to be careful, though, that this 
universalizing process remains a regulative ideal of a rather pragmatic character – not 
dogmatic or with untouchable foundations, and that its aim should be an open dialogue on 
an equal basis with what is good and evil for all human beings, and not some previously 
designed telos or desired state-of-affairs. 
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Let’s now look what is so problematic about universalism. It is being criticized from 
two main positions – firstly, by the deconstructivist or postfoundationalists circles, and 
secondly, from the relativist, communitarian, more anthropological angle. It is true that the 
former has influenced political philosophy and made the cosmopolitan approach to an 
extent limit its theoretical self-assurance. However, the postmetaphysical and post-
foundational critique is actually more directed towards practice of the existing 
cosmopolitanism (or absence of it) and, as such, it loses strength if the concrete steps and 
decisions really contribute to freedom or development; pure abstract critique cannot have 
a major impact because it is not related to actual matters of concern.
1
 The postmodern, 
poststructuralist or post–foundational wish is to debunk all “grand narratives” mainly 
because of their consequences, i.e. because they finish by reproducing the relations of 
power and hegemony. But once the practice is closer to the politics of freedom or 
improvisation and autonomy they praise, the issue of settling epistemological problems 
will not be so important. On the other hand, relativist, culturalist, feminist and 
particularist critique could often be reduced to resistance to hegemony of the First 
world, to an anti-Western attitude making efforts to preclude “the white man’s burden” 
or “forces of domination.” According to Chernilo: “The critics’ position ultimately becomes 
untenable because they fail to grasp that their recognition and protection of particular ways 
of life requires a wider conception of humanity’s ultimate unity” (Chernilo 2009, 546). Also, 
in view of that critique, it should be said that the cosmopolitan project would be 
significantly weakened if there is no universal horizon all humans would be a part of. 
That is to say, the lack of any claim of universality will be harmful to cosmopolitan identities 
and obligations, and will leave the movement disorganized and dependent on local actions. Of 
course, cosmopolitans may (and some of them indeed do) use universalism as an ideological 
weapon, but how this could be better confronted will be shown later. 
The discourse of human needs is deeply cosmopolitan itself (bearing in mind that 
human needs are always needs of individuals), not national or international. Furthermore, 
the cosmopolitan ethics coheres very well with the empowerment of individuals worldwide 
to enable them to follow their preferred way of life. Classical social theory is inseparable 
from universalistic intent, and precisely this feature ties it with the cosmopolitan tradition 
(Chernilo 2007, 32). The universalism of cosmopolitanism unpacks in different realms as 
time passes, so different dimensions of it represent solutions to emerging problems of 
certain historical periods (Chernilo 2007, 19–20). As natural law was surpassed when it 
became indefensible, so it might happen with different elements and types of universalism, 
but not with its normative core. Without normative universalism, it seems that success or 
even the existence of cosmopolitanism is difficult to imagine, but there are still several 
methods through which one can manifest its universalism. Responsible people must not 
throw out the baby with the bathwater. 
3. NEEDS AND RIGHTS: WHICH INSTRUMENTS CAN BE (MIS)USED BETTER? 
Instead of a further debate about the universalism of cosmopolitanism, we tried to be 
shown that the concrete dominant mode of following universalism in practice may be 
amended. In other words, since the centrality of human rights and legislation is one of the 
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Latour 2004, 231–232).  
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main features of today’s cosmopolitanism, what is proposed is a more “universal 
universalism”,2 based on human needs. It would transcend the universalism’ pitfalls created 
in the situation of drastic inequalities. Namely, the discourse of universal human rights 
(which started with Kant) is one of the strongest discourses in contemporary political 
philosophy, but it is flawed in a number of ways to make a real impact on the development 
of a more democratic and prosperous global community. Governments co-opted it, thereby 
reducing its democratic potential (Douzinas 2007, 24). Human rights (whose substance 
and domain is meant to be derived from human needs in order to be protected) lost their 
activistic, radical element, and are just a weapon in political struggles, often used to 
reproduce power relations (Douzinas 2007, 192–193). How does the doctrine of human 
rights help us prevent hunger or epidemics? It practically does not. At the same time, 
human rights are invoked when Western powers want to change regimes they do not like 
in Africa, Latin America or parts of Asia. 
When we consider the role of the state in needs-based cosmopolitanism, one must 
also bear in mind that (in the major part of the world) both human needs and human 
rights are presented in the environment that is characterized by poorly regulated market 
forces, and that present–day consumer culture tends to incorporate ideas of genuine 
human values into very trivial and materialistic processes, so that the universality of 
human needs and/or rights appears only as an impetus of increasing profit for companies 
that provide goods and services qualified as desirable for possession. International financial 
institutions, as well as multinational corporations, significantly reduce the possibility of an 
individual state to refocus the agenda on the basic needs from comparative advantage 
sectors, and the state cannot guarantee the economic well–being of its citizens (Miller 2007, 
45). Television, the Internet, advertising and marketing all function as an universalizing 
force; however, they uphold the system which creates drastic inequalities and reproduces 
situations where millions of people are not able to acquire the basic necessities. 
Law is per definitionem conservative and tends to preserve the status quo. Deeply 
ingrained in liberal discourse, rights prioritise subjective preferences despite the fact that 
these preferences are determined by sources beyond the control of the individual 
(Hamilton 2003, 7). Needs–based politics can transcend the problems of liberal, so–called 
right–preference couple, through stressing the difference between (at least partially) 
objective conditions for normal human functioning and particular wants of individuals in 
a given context. Following human wants (not needs) has become the organizing principle 
of contemporary societies (Douzinas 2007, 36). But, felt needs are at the core of practical 
politics (Hamilton 2003, 14), while rights are abstract and vaguely related to everyday 
life. What benefit do the poor people really have from the fact that they are entitled to 
property rights? Legalizing human wants does not eventually fulfill them, but simply 
change their desired object, since the logic of right is always sketchy, while at the same 
time identities and recognition are not acquired once the group gets the law to protect it 
(for example, from discrimination). Recognizing human needs (not in closed, top–to–
bottom prescription, but in actual and open political struggles) would lead to major 
changes in many countries. The language of needs is more widely used in different cultures 
and civilizations than the one of rights (Brock 2009, 72) 
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universal universalism is to a certain extent similar to the one proposed by Wallerstein. 
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Jeffrey Noonan is the next author who is well aware of the social implications of the 
human rights doctrine, when he argues that the right for private property in practice often 
overrides all other positive rights (Noonan, 2007: 2). Thus, he believes that the defense of 
human rights argument would be much more efficient if directed towards universalizing 
life–interests (Noonan 2006, 242), which are founded on the concept of human needs 
(Noonan 2006, 218). Noonan is criticizing liberal democracy for understanding human 
rights and especially property rights as the bedrock of the political order, while failing to 
ensure that people can acquire what they really need. Needs–based thinking is a core 
mechanism of determining social morality (Noonan 2006, 54). Moral cosmopolitanism, 
therefore, must not bypass it. 
Another important notion that should be introduced is violence. Here it is understood in 
a very broad sense, and includes, besides its direct manifestation, also its structural and 
cultural form (Galtung 1969, 173). Not only someone who was murdered, but the one who 
died from hunger or curable diseases, or committed suicide because of total disrespect, 
discrimination or harsh verbal violence is undoubtedly a victim of violence. All these cases 
where society (through all its institutions, i.e. economic or political system, education) 
directly or indirectly precludes individuals or groups from surviving or living a decent life 
have to fall under the category of violence. And human needs theory may serve as a best 
filter to recognize a whole spectrum of violent forms, from subtle stereotyping and 
disguised racism, labour exploitation to environmental degradation, genocide or war crimes. 
Human rights, even in their more inclusive package – with socio–economic rights included 
– cannot see or expose all the mechanisms which lead to differences in human dignities 
among persons. But, if human needs are not satisfied (not to a minimal extent, and for a 
long period of time) it can definitely be said that states and individuals still support violent 
structures. 
The other problematic aspect of rights is that they reflect a win–lose, black and white 
logic, and that they allude to an elitist, third party approach to define whether the law is 
breached or not (you are guilty or not guilty, allowed to do something or not, and the court 
will decide on that). That is why, for example, conflict resolution theories are concentrated 
more on needs than on rights. A needs-based approach is better equipped to transform 
conflicts and evade violence than adversarial rights-based and power-based approaches 
(Mills 2003, 10–13). A similar thing could be said for the cosmopolitan project, which is 
itself primarily intended for ensuring the well–being of all human beings and reducing 
unjustified damage to anyone. Universal human rights are being criticized as a typically 
Western product, and both Asian theorists (see, for instance, Donnelly 1999, 66–69 and 83–
87, although these critiques are mentioned mostly to be immediately rejected) and Islamic 
thought (see, i.e. Halliday 1995, 152–155) are trying to demystify what they regard as 
particularism that is in a quasi-universal cover. So, the voices from Asian or African 
civilizations proclaim that they face obstacles in accepting human rights as the main 
justification of foreign policy moves (and policy in general), not less because these 
civilizations are not in the same way legalistic or right-based as their Western partners and 
human rights protagonists are. Problems of this kind would probably be surpassed if human 
needs were to get the position human rights now occupy, since their universalism seems more 
visible and acceptable to everyone, and the consequences of forming political claims starting 
from need–satisfaction would be beneficial to a wider circle of individuals and nations.  
Again leaving the theoretical debates aside, it would be wise to take a look at what we 
have in practice regarded as human rights and their “universalism”. Human rights 
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discourse was transformed into an ideology of the rich and powerful states of Europe and 
America, not rarely serving their realpolitik interests in countries that have different 
traditions and/or fiercely defend their sovereignty from foreign meddling. It is pretty clear 
that it would be perceived differently (in the large part of the so–called Third World) if the 
emphasis of science and politics would be on the notion of human needs; that would 
provide its inhabitants with chances to survive, receive education or healthcare. Now, when 
the focus is on human rights, what people in these countries see underscored is a critique of 
their way of life or the imposing of some extraneous and alien norms that are not at all their 
primary concern. So, most human rights ideologies of powerful countries deal with rights 
that are not at all perceived as universal in the large part of the world, while the rights to 
basic education, healthcare, water, nutrition, sanitation that would be better candidates for 
universal status are promoted mostly by financially and politically weak UN agencies. Even 
a casual survey on the debates on human rights in different countries (where issues of 
property, free press or sexual orientation are often dominant) could show us that “….. the 
specific philosophy on which the current “universal” and “official” human rights corpus is 
based is essentially European” (Mutua 1996, 593). Thereby, the practice of social conflicts 
on human rights clearly indicates that needs are closer to universality than rights, since the 
standards of universality are to be set by people, and not by (Western) governments and 
international bureaucracy.  
In no way is this author against human rights. They are an important element of the 
heritage of mankind, and are here to stay (as, of course, they should). What is argued is 
that they are not inclusive enough and that the political and economic order they are an 
instrument of is not capable of making a cosmopolitan ideal of equal moral worth of all 
men true. In that regard, human needs discourse, if promoted, would not be as easily 
misused by the forces that want to keep an unjust distance between countries and people. 
Human rights discourse is loved by the Empire because it is useful in justifying military 
interventions, War on Terror, or enabling super-sovereignty (Chandler 2009, 55 and 68). 
Liberal Empire is constituted through law (Hardt and Negri 2000, 9–10). All these 
opinions are witnesses of the potential and actual aberrations from the ideal of human 
rights. It is possible that some of these problems would remain with us if needs-based 
cosmopolitanism is promoted and applied to contemporary problems, but the situation in 
many parts of the world gives us credence that the change of paradigm is worth giving a 
try, especially if the new paradigm is, in fact, more cosmopolitan than the existing one. 
Global justice and (material) needs-satisfaction 
There are not many authors who contributed to defining and explaining cosmopolitanism 
based on human needs. From the thinkers that consider themselves cosmopolitans, or 
cosmopolitan democrats, very few (at least in the English speaking community, and at 
least explicitly) stated they are supporters of cosmopolitanism of this sort. The work 
interested scholars and practitioners can rely on, thus, comes from the “outside”: in this 
case from the academic field of Global justice, where several authors have identified the 
relation between moral unity of all human beings and the satisfaction of their needs (in 
the first place basic ones like survival, security and freedom). The possibility of a 
cosmopolitan project depends to a large extent on the redistribution of resources, so the 
material needs of millions of people can be taken care of. This is articulated in Gillian 
Brock’s call for the “needs–based minimum floor principle” (Brock 2009, 57–58, Mandle 
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2011, 300). She thinks that the crucial task is to meet basic needs (Brock 2009, 63–69), 
and here huge progress can be made even without some universal agreement on issues 
like measuring the well–being in different cultures and situations, comparing incentives, 
(in)equalities, etc. Therefore, why not set the focus on priorities, meaning the drastic 
incapability of people to achieve a yet–to–be–determined ideal of good life and equality? 
That is to be done, firstly, by proclaiming the threshold of material resources which has 
to be available to everyone; it is also something most people would choose to have 
(Mandle 2011, 301). 
Developmental economist Branko Milanović talks about “creeping cosmopolitanism” 
(Milanović 2007, 18–19), when he analyses the proposals for the redistribution of income 
on a global scale. He shows that needs–based transfers across national borders are 
extraordinarily small when compared to within-national transfers (not to mention objective 
needs), and this is the argument for cosmopolitans to make a case for redistribution 
(Milanović 2007, 3). So, since there is no moral privilege of domestic society (or any society): 
“Grounds for global redistribution, according to the cosmopolitan view, are the same ones as 
grounds for national redistribution” (Milanović 2007, 13). So, if our compatriots (or other 
human beings in general) are in need for basic resources to survive and live a decent life, we 
have to make a transfer to them if we really see them as persons worthy of moral concern. 
That is why Milanović proposes certain global taxes for income–elastic goods or services 
that would be transferred to poor people. Apart from aid and relief assistance, there has to 
be a significant transfer to the Global South, if one wants his cosmopolitanism to be 
sincere and taken seriously. Of course, in order for a cosmopolitan project to actually 
change the world, states must not alone make the regulations and norms of the international 
arena. But, states have the political power and will often counteract the global democratic 
impulse because they will lose this power once the cosmopolitan law substitutes 
international law; that raises the issue of the role of individuals, groups and a civil society 
in bottom-up pressures on respective governments to act.  
The human needs approach to cosmopolitanism is in many ways similar to the human 
capabilities approach, suggested by Martha Nussbaum (Salam 2011, 115) or embraces 
ideas proposed by Amartya Senn. They share concern for providing a decent (if not 
equal) set of opportunities for all human beings, by satisfying the basic needs and making 
human dignity possible. However, philosophy of needs provides even more space for 
empowerment and improving people’s lives, since it can draw from much older and more 
numerous philosophical traditions (from Plato, Aristotle, Marx, Maslow, Marcuse etc.), 
but also because the concept of the need itself is more suitable to stress the active role of 
a political struggle, and because the human functioning in Nussbaum’s work starts from 
the list of already defined set of prerequisites and thereby retains the “dictatorship of 
theory” over dynamic process of feeling and prioritising needs and their satisfaction 
(Hamilton 2003, 12).  
John Rawls’s conception of justice also could be said to have something in common 
with the path Brock has taken, but she insists that people (under the “veil of ignorance”) 
would be more concerned with guaranteeing the minimum floor than with maximizing 
the benefits to those worst-off (Brock 2009, 54–57, Salam 2011, 115). Having applied the 
principles of justice on the global scale, she argues that the results would be quite 
different than Rawlsians expect. What is important is decent conditions for everyone, not 
necessarily equal opportunities (Brock 2009 62) or accepting the famous “difference 
principle”; this conclusion would in practice probably lead to establishing a minimal 
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basic income for all. In other words, what Rawls proposes only for domestic principles of 
justice, she endorses globally (in a slightly modified, needs–based form, Mandle, 2011: 
302). Gillian Brock also convinces us that all human rights from the Universal 
Declaration can be explained in terms of her needs–based approach (Brock 2009, 72). 
This approach, though, is not identical nor grounded on human needs theories developed 
in other scientific disciplines, but it is focused only on primary needs and offers no 
further elaboration of the concept itself and its emancipatory potential. 
Lea Ypi, another author who approaches issues of global justice from the cosmopolitan 
perspective, defends cosmopolitan rights as rights which originate from the duty to fulfil 
basic human needs (Ypi 2006, 4). “Moreover, basic needs can be instrumented as universal 
means or instrument for the pursuit of any purpose” (Ypi 2006, 4) and it is a cosmopolitan 
positive duty to reform political institutions in a way that would make the establishment of 
a global community possible, firstly by meeting the subsistence needs of everyone (Ypi 
2006, 10). Ypi believes that “subsistence rights” should be incorporated into and acquire the 
status of social rights, and that it would also be valuable because it will recognize some of 
the communitarian strong arguments regarding political culture of particular communities 
(Ypi 2006, 11). She also reminds us that cosmopolitan theory of justice based on human 
rights could not be completely suitable to address all emerging issues, and that one must go 
beyond the basic needs for survival if he wants to develop principles of distributive justice 
on a global scale. Cosmopolitanism needs an explanation of the causes of inequality, too 
(Ypi 2006, 13). 
Non–material needs and rudimentary contours of future cosmopolitan theory 
The content of the previous chapter had mostly been focused on material needs, 
especially the need for survival, i.e. by providing basic material resources which are 
necessary for human beings to stay alive (to acquire key satisfiers – food, water, healthcare, 
shelter, clothing, sanitation). But, the actual idea of the paper is to include human needs 
theories in their wholeness (not just the part that deals with the satisfaction of material 
needs) into cosmopolitan reflection. Apart from the Marxist tradition, it is exactly the 
currently dominant liberal and consumerist culture that direct us towards contemplating the 
needs in a mostly materialistic way. That is how the values of freedom, honesty, safety, 
empathy and solidarity, deeply–etched in human nature, are being extracted from the main 
stage of politics and social conflicts and bargainings, giving the way to debates on the 
media, sport, vacations, credits and debts. Subsistence needs are of primary importance, but 
are not all that should be spoken about, since it is precisely the significance of other human 
needs that has to be stressed and these needs should be articulated in a non–violent political 
struggle. What is offered here is just a call, an appeal, for launching a normative project of 
establishing a global democratic community of individuals that is to be derived from the 
notion of universal (but changeable) human needs. A needs-based approach enables us to 
critically reflect on the existing international political system, thus leading to the reorienting 
of political theory and practice towards a new normative paradigm. This paper aspires to 
nothing but to contribute to this approach in a minimal way, and to represent a beginning, 
purely an ounce of “food for thought” and ideas to be developed. 
Cosmopolitan thinkers predominantly write about institutional arrangements of a 
future political and legal order; few of them deal with issues of basic needs (sometimes 
even in an instrumental way), but very few deem human needs the backbone of their 
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theory. The claim of this author is that institutional reforms are not the only primary 
method of empowerment and emancipation of millions of people throughout the world. 
This call for deliberation, for academic and general public dialogue on using the philosophy 
of needs and different theories of needs for developing new cosmopolitanism aims towards 
a situation where all human beings would be the real ultimate units of moral concerns and 
where needs will be satisfied in at least the acceptable degree. All interested individuals are 
entitled and invited to join discussions on the needs and their satisfiers that are to be legally 
protected, once they have enough resources to survive and maintain their essential dignity. 
So, moral cosmopolitanism would have to be partly transformed to a legal one and 
somewhat result in it; however, this legal order would not be self-justifying, but it will draw 
its strength from the universalizing discourse of human needs. Both satisfaction and 
deliberation on needs seeks collective efforts that transcend private morality, and thereby 
recuperate the solidarity and common identity of all members of political community. Thus, 
if the community is meant to be global, this would likely have very positive consequences 
for creating the common identity of all human beings.  
A lot more needs must be taken into account, not just survival, but all the others, or as 
many as possible. That is how conditions might possibly be created for cosmopolitanism to 
succeed better, to show its advantages, and not to be discredited in large parts of the world’s 
population due to its subsequent elements, biases and dilemmas. But which needs exactly 
are being talked about? Burton, for instance, proposes four needs: survival, security, 
identity, autonomy (Burton 1990, 33). Galtung talks about classes of needs: security needs, 
welfare needs, identity needs, freedom needs (Galtung 1978, 14). Maslow defined 5 of 
them: physiological, safety needs, love needs, esteem needs, self–actualization (Maslow 
1943, 374–382). Here, a further elaboration of human needs typologies will not follow, nor 
will the relation between needs (or classes, categories of needs) and their satisfiers be 
examined, since it is extremely complicated and there are neither ambitions nor the space to 
do this. What is important is that these lists of needs have to be open for discussion, and that 
there is not one, single and final prescription of what a human being has to have as its felt 
need. There should be no pretension for universal validity of any particular list of needs. So, 
this author is more willing to get closer to a union approach, when humanity produces a 
vast number of needs (or candidates to the status of a human need) as there is a strive 
towards a universal maximum, rather than a universal minimum (Galtung 1978, 26). 
Every group will have the opportunity to challenge others, which would be a fine tool for 
fighting cultural relativism. Therefore, in no way do we (as scientists or Westerners) want 
to postulate or prescribe what the needs are or should be; this would be open for 
contestation and represent an arena of dialogue for individuals, civilizations and cultures. 
Previous understandings of needs and human nature that used to look at them as fixed 
have to be altered. Needs must not be perceived as static; democratic participation and 
the practice of deliberation precisely embraces contestation and dissent in evaluating 
needs, which testifies that this needs–based universalism may not be paternalistic. This 
universalism would be universalizing universalism, that would be aware of its potential 
particularities and biases, but always with the same goal in mind: opening the possibility 
for maintaining and developing the richness of human species, on a mutual and equal 
basis. It would set the stage for identifying priorities, but also for the exploration of more 
or less universal needs or satisfiers, true vs. false needs, as well as for research about 
actual and historical injustices and/or desires or particular interests that were represented 
as universal needs and rights. As Nancy Fraser assures us, political contestation and 
disagreement is always deep when the proceeding from basic needs to those non-material 
 Universalism Revived: Needs-Based Cosmopolitanism as a Foundation of Global Democracy 87 
and controversial takes place, but that is an opportunity for the development of the 
politics of needs (see, for example, Liebenberg 2007, 184).  
It cannot (perhaps it should not) be said in advance what would be the exact results of 
the aforementioned endeavour. What can be remarked (with quite high probability) is that 
needs-based cosmopolitanism (if practiced) would probably lead to the redistribution of 
some of the world’s resources; it will reduce the inequality gap between the North and the 
South, take more care about the identities and autonomies of different groups (although 
individuals remain referent objects and subjects of the highest priority), enhance security in 
the wider sense of the word, enrich cultural, artistic and academic diversity, provide space 
for discussions which are not necessarily Westernized etc. Hence, this paper calls for the 
rehabilitation of the concept of need and open dialogue (with universalizing motives) about 
alterations of national and international rules and customs, for reason of the sincere 
application of cosmopolitan justice. 
Having said all this, we will now expose three proposals for the future of cosmopolitan 
theory, which will hopefully make a certain impact on research agenda (and, because of that, 
maybe also later on world politics), and that will contribute towards a better understanding 
and acceptance of cosmopolitanism. Thus, cosmopolitan thinkers, protagonists and movements 
should, among else: 
1. Adopt the normative and practical priority of the satisfaction of the basic needs of 
all people – this goal has to be promoted everywhere possible in order to enable all 
human beings not to worry about their subsistence, no matter what changes and reforms 
(political, economic etc.) this achievement would presuppose; 
2. Connect with and borrow from human needs theories and philosophy of needs in 
general, encourage the worldwide dialogue on needs, their satisfiers, the operationalization 
and measurement of their satisfaction – this would lead to the amelioration of the 
anthropological knowledge base and to the implementation of concrete proposals and 
suggestions; 
3. Refrain from accepting or proclaiming any final goal, ultimate desired state-of–affairs, 
nor single definition and list of human needs – this also means that the dialogue on needs 
may not and should not reach its ultimate legal completion, or in any way be exempt 
from a legitimate non–violent political struggle. 
These proposals represent just useful hints for further thinking and activities. Other 
potential recommendations for future cosmopolitan theory are welcome and expected.  
4. UNIVERSALISM, DELIBERATION AND PREDOMINANCE  OF POLITICS OVER LAW 
IN GLOBAL DEMOCRACY 
In our view, cosmopolitanism has to pledge for the global democracy of individuals 
(but also of states or nations, at least in the initial phases of the reforming process), where 
all people should be authorized to participate in making decisions that would oblige them. 
Differences in power (though necessary and advisable to a certain point) must be put 
aside when deciding on decent capabilities of every man to follow his chosen life path. 
Maybe “bringing politics back in” should become the new cosmopolitan motto,3 in the 
                                                          
3 One interesting idea that agrees with this proposal is “political cosmopolitanism”, developed by Vivienne Jabri 
(Jabri 2007, 178–180). In this form of cosmopolitanism, contestation and struggle are of vital importance to 
consesus that is to be reached on global arena of politics. Universality of Jabri’s political cosmopolitanism is 
always on-trial, in question, and represents solidarity in the world of cultural differences (Jabri 2007, 185).  
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situation where politics is commonly perceived just as a sphere of the technical set of 
moves to minimize dysfunctions of the economic system, and where emphasis on economy 
threatens to undermine centuries of struggle for the empowerment and challenging status 
quo (Evrenosoglu 2007, 3–4). How needs are interpreted and which claims are postulated 
as important and legitimate for their satisfaction is and must be a political issue. Human 
needs as a form of universality (in Hegel and Marx) requests practical recognition of 
other persons as social beings (Evrenosoglu 2007, 9–10). This radical universality is also 
present in the existing potential for identifying general damage that is being done to 
people indirectly, namely for marking inherent injustices of the political and social order. 
Universalism of rights is less capable of capturing them. 
Political participation is often seen as almost identical with deliberation. However, the 
two must not be confused (Hamilton 2003, 158). Rawlsian and Habermasian “reasoning 
from the point of view of others” is useful, but its emphasis on consensus and agreement 
could hardly represent a solid ground for the justifications of the universality of 
cosmopolitanism if the concept of human need and its satisfaction are not equal. Only 
after the needs of survival, security and access are satisfied, will humanity have a sufficient 
level of equality to assure the cosmopolitan deliberation runs smoothly. Shared and 
recognized human nature based on needs (not fixed, but one that is to be imagined and 
defined over again) serves as a precondition for global deliberation, since the cosmopolitan 
authority may be maintained only if all individuals and groups see themselves as relatively 
equal (in the sense that their dignity or moral worth is the same as those of others, and that 
they have enough resources and minimal adequate social position they could defend them). 
Deliberative democracy cannot serve as a legitimising ground without the core nucleus of 
universality that is acquired through human needs theory. 
Deliberative practices and cosmopolitanism are complementary, and the deliberation 
in the form of Habermas’ communication action (or in some other from) is productive 
and beneficial. Again, the dialogues and debates could have been put through up to now, 
and they have been. It is not the case that there was no deliberation on the universality of 
human rights or on cosmopolitanism in general. But the deliberation in the future should 
be conducted starting from and in relation to more universal universalism of human 
needs. It is more universal because it takes into account the social position of individuals 
and groups which impedes the possibility of veritable conversation, and because the 
effects of this deliberation have to be quite different from those of previous use of public 
reason, and will lead to significant social changes. On the other hand, it is not the 
deliberation itself that is to justify cosmopolitan norms; norms are justified by postulating 
human nature and human needs as universal (yet possible to influence, non–fixed and 
changeable) notions, while deliberation is an additive, but very important, due to its 
feature of protecting diversity and intersubjectivity and the genuine cosmopolitan-
democratic direction of the whole process.  
Some critics might argue the central importance of human needs would re–affirm the 
importance of the nation–state,4 thereby complicating the establishment of cosmopolitan 
institutions. As for that remark, it is worth noting that it might be true that a needs–based 
approach would lead to strengthening the importance of nation–states (in a practical 
sense, but not necessarily in the sense of a national identity), but that would not have a 
                                                          
4 This is as such because generally a state is seen as the guarantor of their satisfaction; see, for example, Hamilton 
2003, 145–146. 
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negative impact on the cosmopolitan project; actually, what will happen is exactly the 
opposite. It would make human beings from all parts of the world more capable of 
participating in decision making and see themselves as members of the community of 
mankind (via their states, though dominantly as individuals), while deliberating and 
evaluating progress in needs identification and satisfaction. And, what is more important, 
the likelihood of success of the cosmopolitan theory to be accepted would be considerably 
higher if (at least) vital needs of all are met, since the consequences of this approach would 
be such that huge numbers of people would be empowered and can be counted in for 
reforming global order and institutions in the right direction. There is an imperative for the 
existence of coercive authority, but its justification is easier if the human needs are satisfied 
and the people have provided themselves requirements for political participation (Hamilton 
2003, 132–133), than when only human rights are made protected. 
So, human needs cosmopolitanism accepts the role the state has in providing elementary 
prerequisites for a large number of people to receive basic healthcare, education and 
security (including food, water and subsistence security in general). There is, at the 
moment, no other way of taking millions of people out of poverty and misery except that 
their national–state supports them in this process. In the future, cosmopolitanism may think 
of alternatives to the world of nation–states, i.e. a world state or just global governance, 
but in the meantime it cannot consider the state as its adversary, as long as the state 
accepts the duty of fulfilling basic human needs. Thus, the model of state cosmopolitans 
would like to prosper is the welfare state, though it does not necessarily mean the 
Northern type-welfare state, as understood by Habermas. But, economic differences in 
the world are so high that redistribution is needed in order to guarantee the inclusiveness 
of the global democratic processes (Cheah 76–77).  
Conditions for global deliberation have to be created mostly domestically (if the point 
we are starting from in our cosmopolitan endeavour is carefully analysed), and this does 
not mean the return of “methodological nationalism”. The focus on the individual citizen 
as a moral being in the first phase of the cosmopolitan reforms process has to take over 
frameworks of existing states, in order to guarantee the survival, security and basic 
freedom. However, entire international relations and arenas have to be devoted to the 
dialogue on human needs, common human nature and rights to be declared as such, and this 
would be the dialogue of individuals and groups, not just (nor even dominantly) of states. 
The practice of disagreement, debate and non–violent conflicts would not be reserved to the 
nation-state, but will also characterize the global deliberation on needs. Cosmopolitanism 
should aim to conciliate universalism and particularism, and local conditions and life with 
differences have to remain an integral part of the idea (Baban 2003, 18). Multiple belongings 
and intertwined identities would allow us to experience otherness on a daily basis (Baban 
2003, 22), while global democratic bodies will enforce states to obey their obligations 
towards the needs and rights of their citizens. Yet, priority should be given to changing the 
actual state-of-affairs, because a lack of real chances of millions of people to live their life 
without existential concerns is the main reason cosmopolitanism is not more widely 
adopted. Furthermore, the normative prop of cosmopolitanism gets more benefits by 
making lives of populations better at the local, regional, national and all other levels of 
governance, than of the immediate formation of new institutions and organizations of global 
reach in which very few (and almost exclusively the elites) would participate, respect it and 
have hope in.  
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Finally, too much emphasis on rights, courts and the adjudication of basic needs claims 
can have a negative impact on participatory politics and democracy (Liebenberg 2007, 
184). Needs are usually depoliticised by representing them as problems of the market or 
family, and that is why recognizing their satisfaction as entitlement is important 
(Liebenberg 2007, 185). However, needs have to be implemented and interpreted through 
democratic procedures even when they are protected as social rights, and people should 
participate in defining the content and method of their satisfaction (an idea of Nancy 
Fraser, in: Liebenberg 2007, 186). Politics have to be more prominent than law in this 
process, because courts can also depoliticise needs since they perceive people as passive 
recipients of its orders, and the focus is on judgment instead of social relations that 
caused deprivation (Liebenberg 2007, 187). It is evident, therefore, that needs are better 
than rights in empowering human beings, and without empowerment cosmopolitanism is 
both inaccessible and to a large degree pointless. 
5. CONCLUSION 
A real democratic community of substantively equal persons will not be established 
unless cosmopolitanism overcomes obstacles and defeats other circulating ideas. The 
very process of deliberation will contribute to the strengthening and steering of the 
cosmopolitan identity and cosmopolitan norms, but the universalizing background (rooted 
in human needs discourse) must not be abandoned. Even if it is assumed that universalism 
has lost the battle (with postfoundationalist and postmodernist thinkers), the author of this 
paper thinks it is in practice nowadays needed perhaps more than before; the unintended 
consequence of deconstructing all grand narratives might be the weakening of the only 
set of ideas that is normatively authoritative enough to overthrow the violent and unfair 
institutions, rules and norms of contemporary societies. So, instead of compiling forces to 
try to somehow answer the post-foundational theoretical critiques, cosmopolitans should 
focus on advocating concrete reforms heading towards improving as many lives as possible 
in different countries. That is how reliance on moral concerns could be persuasive. 
To avoid our universalizing background to represent a supplement to the Empire, a 
strong inclusive culture and “grassroot” political practice of people with basic needs 
satisfied can serve as the most important mechanism. The version of cosmopolitanism 
that seems dominant today (liberal and rights-based) is not convincing enough, because it 
is accompanied by politics of power and sometimes brute force. Universalism can always 
be misused, but it is not easy to see how cosmopolitanism can be sustainable without 
universalist aspirations. So, perhaps more time and energy should be devoted to different 
universalism, the one that is human needs–based. All people should participate in the 
dialogue on needs, including questions of identifying legitimate political claims and how 
needs are interpreted and satisfied, but also in determining obligations of individuals and 
states towards human beings within and across state borders. Supremacy of the needs–
based approach will be proved in political practice, not in theory, where it is difficult to 
weigh arguments and their potential implications. 
What must be taken care of is the tendency of some need-theorists to postulate final 
solutions to all problems and to offer ultimate accounts of human nature. One might say 
that need is a dangerous notion with possible totalitarian effects, and that it perceives 
people as passive, dependent receivers of help or satisfaction. However, there is no 
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logical nor necessary relationship between needs and dependency (Evrenosoglu 2007, 6). 
Only if there is an assumption that man is powerless, and that he has no realistic chance 
of influencing the interpretation of needs or of accessing the object of his need, could it 
be said that a person is passive and dependent. Bureaucratic, elitist and authoritarian/ 
totalitarian tendencies in institutionalizing needs can be successfully fought with democratic 
practices, and individual freedom always remains the ultimate objective of social organization 
(Noonan 2006, 130). The discourse of needs is also criticized for being paternalistic, but 
Hamilton gives us four mechanisms for ensuring the anti-paternalistic character of the 
philosophy of needs (Hamilton 2003, 167). Moreover, whether paternalism is always bad is 
something that is not undisputed.  
Cosmopolitanism is the best and perhaps only ethically plausible answer to the 
challenges of globalization, and to the problems of justifying political order in general. If it 
is rooted in the philosophy and practice of human needs, it has a better chance of ensuring 
all people are ready and willing to participate in the global deliberation. Men have the 
responsibility to enable the needs of others to be met (Brock 2009, 68), and this should be 
of extreme importance to cosmopolitanism. The democratic community of the world, with a 
universalizing moral code in its base, can be created when individuals and groups have their 
basic needs met, and participate (from a more or less equal social standing) in a dialogue on 
the development of (other, non–material) needs, their satisfaction, as well as on the rights 
and obligations of all men. The debate between universalism and anti-universalism may 
continue, while, at the same time, mankind engages in a constructive critique of the system 
in which many people are deprived of satisfiers necessary to preserve their essential dignity, 
and in which, therefore, the cosmopolitan identity is extraordinarily difficult to be achieved 
and developed. This is just a very clumsy beginning, a possible proposal and agenda for re–
directing cosmopolitan thinking, and hopefully there will be more (and more important) 
contributions in that regard 
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OŽIVLJENI UNIVERZALIZAM: 
KOSMOPOLITIZAM ZASNOVAN NA POTREBAMA 
KAO TEMELJ GLOBALNE DEMOKRATIJE  
U ovom radu se tvrdi da bi kosmopolitizam zasnovan na potrebama bio najlegitimniji način 
organizovanja globalne zajednice u nastajanju. Ovakav kosmopolitizam treba da bude utemljen na 
pojmu osnovnih ljudskih potreba, kao što su, na primer: bezbednost, autonomija, identitet i 
blagostanje. Iako je pojam ljudske potrebe univerzalistički (time oslobađajući prostor za meta-
konsenzus), “ljudska priroda” koja se izvodi iz ovog pojma nije nužno fiksna. Promišljanje potreba 
i politička praksa njihovog zadovoljenja će omogućiti istinski napredak kosmopolitizma, i to brže i 
bez brojnih problema sa kojim se danas suočava pristup zasnovan na ljudskim pravima. Globalna 
demokratija zahteva izvestan univerzalizam u etici, ali on mora da bude drugačiji od onih sa 
kojima se do sada pokušavalo, dok, u isto vreme, svakodnevna pozicija pojedinaca u različitim 
delovima sveta mora da bude značajno poboljšana. 
Ključne reči:  ljudske potrebe, kosmopolitizam, univerzalizam, deliberacija, globalna pravda, 
demokratija. 
 
